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Effort Perception is Made More 
Accurate with More Effort and 
When Cooperating with Slackers
Paul Ibbotson1*, Christoph Hauert2 & Richard Walker3
Recent research on the conditions that facilitate cooperation is limited by a factor that has yet to be 
established: the accuracy of effort perception. Accuracy matters because the fitness of cooperative 
strategies depends not just on being able to perceive others’ effort but to perceive their true effort. In 
an experiment using a novel effort-tracker methodology, we calculate the accuracy of human effort 
perceptions and show that accuracy is boosted by more absolute effort (regardless of relative effort) 
and when cooperating with a “slacker” rather than an “altruist”. A formal model shows how such 
an effort-prober strategy is likely to be an adaptive solution because it gives would-be collaborators 
information on when to abort ventures that are not in their interest and opt for ones that are. This 
serves as a precautionary measure against systematic exploitation by extortionist strategies and a 
descent into uncooperativeness. As such, it is likely that humans have a bias to minimize mistakes in 
effort perception that would commit them to a disadvantageous effort-reward relationship. Overall we 
find support for the idea that humans have evolved smart effort detection systems that are made more 
accurate by those contexts most relevant for cooperative tasks.
The degree to which humans cooperate with each other is unique in the natural world. It is woven in to the cul-
tural fabric of our lives and without it many of our most human achievements – law, government, trade, educa-
tion, language – would not be possible1–8. Cooperation has attracted a lot of attention not just because humans 
are an ultra-cooperative species but that it appears to run contrary to the fundamentally competitive nature of 
evolution by natural selection9.
Cooperation can actually enable individuals to become better competitors, because the cost of short-term 
unselfish behavior is repaid by the selfish long-run benefits8–10. Although cooperation can yield rewards it remains 
a fundamentally risky business because failed cooperation can leave an individual worse off than no cooperation 
at all11. For this reason people are choosy about whom they cooperate with12,13 and mitigate some of the risk by 
collaborating with those with a reputation for fairness14–16 or by shunning or punishing those who free-ride on 
others17–20.
The costs and benefits of cooperation have been most frequently quantified using monetary payoffs or pen-
alties. However, for the majority of species and for most of human history the costs of collaboration are better 
characterized as time and effort. Much of human cooperation is fundamentally mutualistic in nature (foraging, 
hunting, fishing), so the effort of each cooperative partner must be monitored and coordinated and in order that 
anybody gains the rewards of a collaborative venture11,21. Recently, attention has turned to the circumstances 
under which people are willing to invest effort. For example, it has recently been shown that people are likely to 
persist longer, are more committed and perform better in a cooperative task when they perceive their partner to 
have invested more effort22,23. While perceptions are important, the significance of these findings is limited by a 
underlying factor that has not been investigated: the accuracy of effort perception. Accuracy matters because the 
fitness of behavioral strategies depends not just on being able to perceive others’ effort but to be perceive their 
true effort. For example, cooperators whose perceptions of effort only loosely correspond with reality are likely 
to be out-competed by those who can systematically avoid their fair share of effort but can still gain the rewards 
of cooperation. Therefore one would expect pressure to evolve ever-more accurate effort detection cognition, 
heightened by those contexts most relevant for cooperative tasks24. We test this hypothesis by systematically 
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varying relative effort and asking people to judge the effort of others in an online cooperative game. In this game, 
two players invest effort by pushing virtual balls up a ramp and into a bucket controlled by clicks of the mouse. 
The rewards are shared 50/50 between the players. As such, the game emphasizes the mutual interdependence of 
partners in the form of ‘sharing of the spoils’ – a behavior that seems to have played an important role in cement-
ing cooperative exchanges in our evolutionary past7,25,26. The required response from participants was simple: 
who put in more effort into the task, you or your partner? (see Methods).
To determine the validity of relative effort perception, we needed to systematically vary the effort between two 
collaborators. We could not and did not want to control the absolute effort of the human participants and for that 
reason, the ‘other player’ was in fact controlled by a computer algorithm designed to vary the effort as a ratio of 
the participant’s effort (Supplementary Information). By doing so we could measure each participants’ absolute 
effort, their effort relative to their virtual collaborator, and objectively determine the accuracy of perceived effort.
Result
Participants correctly predicted whether their partner was an ‘altruist’ or a ‘slacker’ with an accuracy of 78.6% 
(Fig. 1a). A Chi-squared test revealed a significant difference between Altruist and Slacker conditions in the num-
ber of correct and incorrect responses χ2 (1) = 32.78, p < 0.001 (Fig. 1b), such that when human participants were 
paired with a slacker, they were on average more accurate in their perception of effort.
To calculate the predicted probabilities of participants giving an accurate response across a continuous range 
we plotted a logistic curve of the general form =
+ − −
P 1
(1 exp( a bX))
 where P is the predicted odds for accuracy 
(0–1), and a and b are parameters of the model fitted to the data. The specific values of these parameters are shown 
in Fig. 2 for Absolute Effort (a), as well as Slacker (b) and Altruist (c) partners. To investigate the hypothesis that 
absolute effort predicts accuracy of effort perception we conducted a binary logistic regression with accuracy 
(correct = 1, incorrect = 0) as our dependent variable and effort (number of clicks) as a predictor. The result was 
significant χ2 (1) = 5.708, p = 0.017, such that every unit increase in effort increased the logs odd for accuracy by 
0.011, p = 0.019, 95% CIs [1.002, 1.021] (See Fig. 2a). This means that, regardless of the relative effort of their 
collaborator, the more effort people put into the task the more likely they were to make correct judgements about 
their partner’s effort, getting 78.6% of them correct, on average. We then spilt the absolute effort data by Slacker 
and Altruist conditions. Participants in the Slacker scored 87.8% correct and the model was not significant χ2 
(1) = 0.079, p = 0.779, showing absolute effort does not predict accuracy in the slacker condition essentially 
because participants are already getting 87.8% correct (see Fig. 1b). That fact that it was not significant in this case 
does not allow us to talk about a meaningful change in the outcome variable from the predictor variable. 
Participants in the Altruist condition scored 68.3% correct and the model was significant χ2 (1) = 4.608, p = 0.035, 
such that for every unit increase in effort there was a predicted change in the logs odd for accuracy of 0.014, 
p = 0.019, 95% CIs [1.001, 1.028].
Figure 1. Absolute effort (a) shows a histogram of the number of responses (y-axis) of participants in the 
experiment providing x amount of effort (x-axis is divided into bin sizes of 2). For each amount of participant 
effort their perception about the computer’s effort, could either be right or wrong, and so the bar is divided into 
correct responses and incorrect responses stacked on top. Relative effort (b) is calculated as a ratio of the human 
effort to the computer player, where “slacker” indicates that the computer player was putting in less effort than 
the human, “fair share” that they were matched in effort and “altruist” where the computer was putting in more 
effort. Error bars represent 95% CIs.
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Discussion
We investigated the accuracy of peoples’ perception of effort. Overall, people were largely accurate in their per-
ceptions of others’ effort, correctly judging who is putting in more or less effort 78.6% of the time (Fig. 1a). 
However, there were certain contexts in which this accuracy was heightened. Effort perception was made more 
accurate when that partner was a “slacker” rather than an “altruist” (Fig. 1b). Effort perception of a partner was 
also made more accurate when people put in more effort themselves, regardless of what their partner was doing 
(Fig. 2a). In what follows we interpret our findings under the framework of Error Management Theory (EMT)27,28 
which has provided evidence across a range of behaviors that these types of perceptual biases represent adaptive 
solutions to the decision-making problems of our evolutionary past24,27,29–36.
In everyday encounters, as in this experiment, people are required to make decisions about their potential 
collaborators under uncertainty and the judgments are therefore prone to error. A participant could believe their 
partner was putting in more effort when they are putting in less (false positive) or putting in less effort when they 
are putting in more (false negative). Whenever the payoff is not equal between false positives and negatives, it is 
likely that natural selection will favor cognitive biases that minimize whichever mistakes incur the greatest costs, 
rather than minimizing the total number of mistakes itself29,37. The consequences for wrongly attributing more 
effort to a partner, risks wasting effort on a cooperative venture that yields little rewards. The consequences for 
wrongly attributing less effort to a partner, risks abandoning a cooperative venture that could yield high (shared) 
rewards.
Risk and stakes increase with absolute effort because the more effort someone invests in a task the more 
they stand to gain but also the more they stand to lose: if a (big enough) reward does not materialize to offset 
the investment, they could be left in metabolic debt (starving) or bankrupt (dead). Thus, it makes sense that 
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of participants giving an accurate response based on binary logistic regression. 
The intensity of the circles denote the frequency of participants response for a given effort, see individual scales. 
Note Fair Share was not tested as all 14 cases were incorrect responses.
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people get increasingly vigilant and acutely monitor the effort of others the more effort they commit themselves 
to the task. Relative effort perception is important to correctly perceive the partner’s effort in order to determine 
whether the costs-benefits of cooperation are not in an individual’s favor, and to reduce the chance to collaborate 
with a slacker, regardless of the absolute efforts of their partner.
Because we have established that perceptions of effort have a tight relationship to true effort, in both absolute 
and relative terms, this grounds behavioral strategies based on effort perception in the reality of energy expendi-
ture. This opens the door for effort-strategies to form part of the human cognitive repertoire for keeping cooper-
ation on track. For example, if it appears as if the distribution of effort amongst partners is such that no one will 
receive the reward, or simply that the goals of the partners are not aligned, it may be better to cut losses and switch 
to a strategy that secures a lower payoff, but with lower risks. Sensitivity to relative effort could therefore mitigate 
some of the risk of choosing cooperation because it provides information on whether and when to abort cooper-
ative ventures that are not in their interest. There are abundant examples of withdrawal of cooperation in the face 
of a lack of effort and the ostracism of the slackers in the ethnographic record38–41. Recent modelling work shows 
probabilistic abstention in certain cooperative contexts can be an optimal strategy42. To investigate the advantage 
that an effort-probing strategy has on cooperation, we used the classic Stag-Hunt game11,21. In this scenario, two 
players can hunt their own low-value prey (hare) or they can coordinate their effort to catch the higher value prey 
(stag). The different outcomes are summarized with the payoff matrix (Table 1) where each partner’s share of the 
stag is normalized to one and the value of a hare is 0 < a < 1.
Hunting the stag is the efficient and mutually preferred outcome but for a > 1/2 catching a hare is the risk 
dominant strategy. This generates a conflict because each partner is aware that they need each other to capture the 
stag but hunting it alone means forsaking both options. Formally, introducing a prober strategy is capable of mit-
igating the risk of opting for stag. Probers make a small initial investment, ε≪1, (or series of small investments) 
and if the partner reciprocates they choose stag but if the partner fails to reciprocate they minimizes their losses 
by opting for hare. This results in an extended payoff matrix (Table 2) and introduces another coordination game 
between the hare and prober strategies, while prober and stag are neutral.
Stag Hare
Stag 1, 1 0, a
Hare a, 0 a, a
Table 1. Stag-Hunt payoff matrix.
Stag Hare Prober
Stag 1, 1 0, a 1, 1 
Hare a, 0 a, a a, a-ε
Prober 1, 1 a-ε, a 1, 1 
Table 2. Extended Stag-Hunt Payoff Matrix.
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In an evolutionary setting the dynamics of a population can be investigated based on the replicator equation, 
 = −x x f f( )i i  where xi denotes the frequencies of strategy i with ∑ =x 1i i , fi their average payoff and f  the 
average population payoff43. For stag-hunt interactions (see Eq. 1) this represents the classical case of a coordina-
tion game with bi-stable dynamics: both homogeneous population states are stable with everyone hunting 
(xstag = 1) or (xhare = 1), respectively11. Most importantly, however, once a population is trapped in the hare equi-
librium it is very difficult to re-establish the mutually preferred cooperative stag hunts because of the associated 
risk and reliance on the partner’s behavior.
The prober strategy provides an escape hatch out of the inefficient hare equilibrium and paves the way for 
successful coordination on hunting stags even under adverse conditions where hare is the risk dominant strategy 
in the absence of prober (Fig. 3a). With this change, prober and stag (or any mixture of the two) become the risk 
dominant strategy regardless of a.
Naturally, prober is a more sophisticated strategy than both unconditional stag or hare because it requires 
cognitive abilities to perceive the efforts of partners, compare it to its own and change behavior in response. 
Maintaining these cognitive abilities can be costly and would reduce the payoff of prober in payoff matrix (2) 
by some amount against any partner. However, this does not change the role of prober as a potent promoter for 
efficient coordination (Fig. 3b). In summary, this strategy efficiently reduces the risk of mutualistic endeavors 
because readily detecting shirking partners prevents wasted efforts and allows to abort cooperative ventures that 
are not in an individual’s interest. Introducing behavioral strategies that probe a partner’s effort at small costs 
effectively promotes cooperation by readily abandoning interactions with bleak perspectives. Moreover, the cog-
nitive bias provides further protection against subtle exploitation through extortionist strategies44.
A strategy to categorize would-be collaborators entirely on the basis of their effort contribution cannot 
explain experimental evidence that shows adults and children are sensitive to difference between unwilling part-
ners (e.g., exploitative free-riders) versus unable partners (e.g., unintentional uncooperativeness due to acci-
dent, illness or bad luck) even when effort is held constant45,46. However, acknowledging human sensitivity to 
the ‘unable-unwilling’ distinction does not rule out the role that relative effort perception plays in supporting 
cooperation when intentions, competence and luck are held constant and effort varies (a condition that contrasts 
with46). This sensitivity may be especially important when the outcomes of collaborative efforts are tightly tied to 
the relative efforts of the participants, the role of luck and mistakes is diminished and thus the need for psycholog-
ical mechanisms to detect the difference between unwilling versus unable is also diminished. For example, some 
collaborative activities are by their nature lower-variance, lower risk ventures (e.g., foraging) when compared 
with others (e.g., hunting). In societies with more predictable diets, the effort one puts in is more proportionate 
to output one receives. Such economies predict a relatively increased role for relative effort sensitivity and the 
behavioral strategies (such as ‘Prober’) that are contingent upon it38,47,48.
In our Methodology, after balls fell off the edge of the ramp they were occluded behind the bucket. The total 
number of balls in the bucket was never revealed to participants to prevent them counting the relative frequency 
of balls in the bucket after the trial has finished. The most salient information they had available to them during 
the trial was the relative frequency that the balls were being pushed up the ramp – our measure of effort. Thus in 
our task outcome is directly proportionate to effort. Future variations on this methodology may want to develop 
Figure 3. Simplex plot of replicator dynamics with three strategies stag, hare and prober. Each corner marks 
homogeneous populations of only the corresponding strategy. (a) With the help of prober essentially all 
population configurations eventually converge to everyone opting for stag or prober or any mixture of the 
two (the stag-prober-edge is neutral). Moreover, the threshold for prober to escape the homogeneous hare 
equilibrium is very small. In contrast, in the absence of prober, hare is risk dominant as reflected in the much 
larger basin of attraction of hare as compared to stag (bottom edge of the simplex). (b) The role of prober does 
not change if the costs ε apply regardless of the type of partner but now stag outperforms prober in the absence 
of hare such that stag becomes the sole, risk dominant strategy. Parameters: a = 0.8, ε = 0.01, i.e. probing costs 
are 1% of the benefit for successful coordination on the efficient outcome. In both scenarios the two unstable 
equilibria are located at Q = (1-a, a, 0) and P = (1-ε/(1-a), 0, ε/(1-a)).
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a more indirect relationship between outcome and effort, such as a ball that slides back down the ramp if it has 
not been pushed within a certain time frame. Pilot experiments revealed that participants were sensitive to subtle 
social framing of the effort detection task, for example, instructing participants that the rewards will divided 
according to individual effort rather than 50/50 as in the present study. The fact that these sensitivities occurred 
with the exact same perceptual stimuli (balls moving up ramps) suggests that participants’ top-down knowledge 
of the cooperative task interacted with the bottom-up perception of effort.
Overall, we find support for the idea that humans have evolved accurate effort detection systems, heightened 
by those contexts most relevant for cooperative tasks24. Accuracy of effort, and not just perception of effort22,23, 
matters because increased metabolic expenditure in cooperative tasks is regulated by the true nature of the effort 
not by perceived effort.
Collaborative effort is needed for a wide range of cooperative activities from the more psychological (e.g., 
group problem solving49) to the more physical (e.g., cooperative pulling paradigm25). To the extent that all collab-
orative ventures pose the same basic problem of coordination they should engage similar mechanisms designed to 
mitigate the risk of disadvantageous partnerships. Thus we expect that the same heightened awareness of relative 
effort and absolute effort would be engaged across a range of physical and mental cooperative tasks as long as 
there is some public production of a good that is shared.
The modeling of an effort-prober strategy shows this is likely to be adaptive because it gives would-be collab-
orators information on when to abort ventures that are not in their interest and opt for ones that are. As such, 
it is likely that humans have a bias to minimize mistakes in effort perception that would commit them to a dis-
advantageous effort-reward ratio. This turns cooperation in to a less risky strategy than if no such bias existed. 
In conclusion, providing behavioral escape routes to abort social interactions50 may be one paradoxical way to 
boost cooperation because it serves as an insurance against incompatible goals and prevents exploitation through 
free-riders.
Method
An online computer game was played by 190 undergraduates enrolled on a Psychology Module at a University 
in the UK.
All experimental protocols were approved by The Open University Research and Ethics Committee. All meth-
ods were performed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations, including obtaining informed 
consent from all participants and their right to withdraw from the experiment and their right to withdraw their 
data. Each “game” consisted of 5 trials such that there were 947 data points (with 3 points of omission due to one 
participant not completing all 5 trials). Before the game began, they received the following instructions:
You are going to a play a series of games. Each game lasts 10 seconds. The aim of the game is to move balls into 
a bucket by pushing them up a ramp. Another player will be doing the same thing as you. You control your pushes 
by clicking the mouse anywhere inside the grey rectangle. The more effort you put in the more balls will go in the 
bucket. The other player controls their pushes by doing the same thing as you. At the end of the game the total 
number of balls in the bucket will be split 50/50 between you and the other player.
After participants had read these instructions, they played the game, and at the end of each game the partici-
pant’s task was simple: decide whether they put in more or less effort than the other player (Fig. 4).
Participants were not explicitly told that they would have the same partner over all 5 rounds but neither were 
they told the other player would change. We suspect the use of “player” and “the other player” rather than “play-
ers” lead most people to assume they were playing with one person over the 5 rounds.
Data availability
Source data available on request.
Figure 4. Example Screenshot of the Game. The left-right order of the ‘Other player’ and ‘Me’ buttons was 
randomized.
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